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Jaszi: Names and Objects in Rilke's Poetry

Andrew O. ]aszi

NAMES AND OBJECTS
INRILKE'S POETRY

Namen und Dinge. It is not
.
surprising that Rilke was interested in the names things'
have, for they were the raw material of his art. He believed that as a poet he could transform this perishable world and
that he could create an enduring and perfcct reality simply by
joining words one to anpther. His interest in Dinge, awakened as
early as his interest in words. He came to feel tbat objects were
his only friends; and from the beginning of his conscious life to
its end, he was convinced that things were far more real than are
most human beings. \Vhen he wanted to find a word of highest
admiration for a human being-for the Danish author Jacobsen,
for Tolstoi, for· Rodin, for Cezanne-he ,~ould say that they were
lik~ things; but if he searched his mind for a word worthy of
naming an object-a mountain, a tree, a broken toy-he could
find none. For he felt that names did not reveal what objects
really were, but rather hid, falsified, and in the end, destroyed
them.
Rilke loved objects; but, like many of his leading contemporaries, he was tormented by the feeling that some terrible catastrophe had wiped away everything on earth. Foremost among the \
reasons for this mood of despair which passed over Europe in
Rilke's youth was perhaps the fact that the image of God had disappeared from the hearts of men. "God is dead,"'is Zarathustra's
message as he descends from the mount;tin. "Everything is empty,
nothing matters, everything was!" In speaking about Auguste
Rodin, Rilke once exclaimed that we live in a time "which has no
outside. For the inside which constitutes
objects, no houses,
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this age is without form, impossible to grasp: it flows:' What b~ :i t
comes of the word "house" when there are no houses? \Vhat hap·
pens to names when the objects which they once named shed their
reality? Strangely enough, a condition may arise ,~hich seems to
favor the producti~n of great lyric poetry. These names which no
longer name, these spectral words, begin to respond willingly to
the slightest stirring of ,the poet's heart. They are free to do so, because they are no longer answerable to the heavy reality of objects
and to the inexorable laws which govern them. But in seeming to
depict the world, the poet in truth only mirrors his own feelings
in words which have lost their substance. In Rilke's youthful
poetry the trend is away from dle concrete into the rCi\lm of longing for the sake of longing, of words for the sake of a melody: into
premonitions, dreams, nothingness. Likewise, In his early letters, the slightest concrete incident may serve as an excuse for
rising high above all that is tangible on the wings of a fanciful
metaphor.
Thus Rilke, who was later to be preoccupied with transforming objects, began his career by discarding them. But even while
escaping into language, he yearned to experience the structure of
reality as it might have been before man imposed upon it the \.
structure of his sentences.

I am so afraid of the words of men.
They pronounce everything so distinctly:
And this is called dog and that is called house,
And here is' the beginning and the end is there.
I shall always warn and ward off: Don't come ncar.
I 80 mqdl like to hear the singing of things.
You touch them: tbey are rigid and mute.
You are murdering all my things.
Ie/a fiire/ate mich so VOT der Afense/um lVOTt.
Sie sprecllen (lUes so deutlich aus:
Und dieses heisst Hund und jenes heisst Haus,
und hier ist Beginn und das Ende ist dort.
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Ieh will immer wamen und wehren:Bleibt fern.
Die Dinge singetz hor ieh so gem.
lilT rilhrt sie an: sie sind starr und stumm.
Ihr bringt mir aile die Dinge um.

\Vhy not call a dog a dog;or a house a house? \Vhat is ther(tin the
meaning of words which does violence to that which they signify?
Picture a man walking. Now he is running. Now he is raising
his arm. At each movement, the rearrangement·of his limbs lends
his body a different shape, yet the man remains the same man.
And if his name was Jones when he left home, it will still be Jones
when he reaches his destination. Consider an apple or an apple
tree-they, too, change and yet remain the same: the tree as the
wind passes through its branches. the apple as the sun tinges its
skin, and both as they grow, mature, and decline with the changing seasorts of the year. Appearance changes, but being r~mains
the same. Othe~...ise, at every moment we would all surrender our
identities in favor of an unending series of transformations. And
all the dictionaries of the world would Qot suffice to say this
much: uapple:' For the words of language are not ready-made
labels which we attach at random to equally ready-made -objects.
Before objects could come into existence, language had to separate being from appearance; it had to bring order into what preceded it, the flux of prelinguistic chaos.!
But it is precisely against such a linguistic separation of being
and appearance that Rilke came to protest as his poetic genius
matured. For if it is true that in his youth he was unfaithful to the
visible world of objects, in his manhood he learned to see as few
poets before him: and he came to love what he saw. He loved the
surfaces of things so well, their shapes, colors,..:textures, and the
ceaseless change and motion of these, that in th~ end he found it
hard to believe that there should be hidden behmd them that unchanging and intractable identity of existence which we have in
~

1 The lIotion that there exists iuch an intimate interronnenion bettvcen language
.md the world of perception is stressed. again and again in the three volumQ of
Ernst Cassirer's Philosop/lie der symboliscllen formen (Berlin. 1925. 192!;, 1929).
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mind when we designate an object by its name. The object of art
is "nameless as a plain is nameless or a sea that has a name only on
the map, in books, and to men, but which, in reality, is nothing
but distance, motion and depth." Namcnlos; nameless, is one of
Rilke's favoJ:ite words.
In his more despondent moments, to be sure, Rilke knew that
being and appearance must remain separate in a world which we
have mastered linguistically. However, there is a sphere which
seems to defy the laws of language and ordinary experience, one
in which the entire existence of an object can be condensed into
a sensuous surface-the sphere of art. Who can change the color
of an apple in one of Cezanne's still-lifes and say that the apple itself is .not changed, but only its color? Or take the dance. 'Vhen a
great dancer dances, he has no other existence than his everchanging appearance. You do not see a man who exists and moves,
but a motion in which a man creates himself, a motion in which
the soul of a man suddenly rises into visibility, only to disappear
when the dance ends and the dancer becomes once more an ordinary man, his body no longer embodying~his soul but hiding it
from your eyes.
"But let us consider for a moment, whether everything before
us isn't s1¥'face, everything we percieve and explain and interpret? And what we call spirit [Geist] and soul and love: isn't all
that but a slight change on the small surface of a near fac~? ..
And he who could see and render all forms, would be not (almost
without knowing it) give us all of spirit; everything that has ever
been called longing or pain or bliss or wbich can have no name at
all in its ineffable spirituality?" Perhaps the deepest reason why
Rilke deplored the separation of being and appearance was because he felt tbat soul was in danger of being explained away, .
talked away. Talked away in the literal sense. For he believed that
objects and humans alike ha\'e a soul only inasmuch as their entire being is, in the manner of the dance, contained in their appearance; but as we have just said, it is precisely this union of
existence and appearance which language must destroy if it is to
bri~g into play the energies which constitute it.
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It was in Rodin's studios that Rilke learned the magic of sur·
face, motion, and change; and we must turn to his letters of these
years as well as to his book A uguste Rodin (the two parts of which
are dated 1903 and 1907) if we wish to understand what he meant
when !Ie used the word Ding in the middle period of his life. A
Ding is nothing but an aesthetic surface, one which contains being. "The model," wrote Rilke, seems to exist; the object of art·
exists. Thus one is a nameless progress over the other, the silent
and ever-rising realization of the desire to be which emanates
from everything in nature." By transmuting an object of nature
into an object of art, translating it into color, sound, shape, or
motion, the artist raises potential existence to the status of full
actuality. And now the overwhelming idea began to dawn upon
R~lke that it is the artist's task to transform not only tbis object
or that, but nature in its totality, and by so doing to render it real
and eternal. Nothing must be omitted, no matter how insignificant, ugly, or even repulsive it may appear 'to be. This is,the positive significance of his only novel Die A ujzeiclmungen des Malte
Laurids BriggeJ Diaries of My Other Self (1910), with its dismal
scenes of disintegration and decay.
#I

o B J E C T SAN DNA M E S. You cannot name objects whose existence is contained in their appearan,fe. But what is the use of
even trying to name, to pin-point linguistically, the object of art?
You cannot name an object of art if, as Rilke believed, it is the
function of art to transform something that does not exist and has
a name into something that exists and is nameless. DlngeJ Rilke's
Dinge, are nameless; How could Rilke, by using names, create
';gmething nameless?
'l>
Ernst Cassirer once compared the color of objects to the meaning of signs. Neither the word nor the color is one with the object yet both represent it. A painter's colors, howe~er, do not represent or designate, but contain and embody. Rilke's aim was to
use words as a painter like Cezanne used colors and not as nature
does. But his poems of this period fall short of this ideal goal. His
words do not contain and embody, but mean and designate. Or to
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put it differently, his language is more descriptive than lyric. But
what his words describe, and this is essential for an understanding
of these poems, is not the ordinary object as you and I see it, but
the object transformed by the eyes of the artist. These poems have
aptly been called Dinggedichte, objective poems. They are objective in the double sense of not expressing the feelings of the poet
but the essence of objects and in the sense of being poetic descriptions of objects (in the very broad meaning which this word had
come to assume in Rilke's vocabulary), descriptions of a staircase,
a merry-go-round, a plant, an animal, a work of art, a human being. These objective poems, along with others, are collected in
the two parts of Neue Gedichte, New Poems, of 1907 and 1908~
Thus, as Rilke matured, he had a clear and specific vision of a
non-linguistic realm of Dinge and was left with the problem of
how to express it in words. In the years that followed, he was
plagued by the fear that his inability to express this vision would
invalidate his entire life's-work. There were moments when he
came close to doubting his mission. But with the Duino Elegies
and the Sonnets to Orpheus (1922) he seemed to have realized
his vision at last.
"... und WOitU Dichter in dilrftiger Zeit?" \Vhy be a poet in
this barren age? It was not Rilke who asked this question, but
Friedrich HOlderlin, more dlan a hundred years before. "Sag ihm
die Dinge." "Tell him the things:' These words of the Ninth
Elegy ring out like an answer to HOlderlin's question. "Ihm" is
the angel of the Elegies, pure existence, highest embodiment of
reality. Names and objects. sagen and Dinge, are united here with
one another, and both with the angel. \Vhat kind of union is this?
\Vhat mode of saying has Rilke in mind? How can you sayan object: a jug. a tfee,. a window? Not dIe act of talking about things.
is meant, which leaves the talked-about things unmoved and untouched, but that of evoking a thing, of making it exist through
its transformation into the pure language of poetry. Build a
house. constl~uct a bridge, say a Ding. l\fake a thing by saying it.
"1'anz! die Orange:' "Dance the orange." These words appear in
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the Fifteenth Sonnet, If we look at Rilke's poems literally. we will
understand him better. His metaphors are not meant to be reduced to abstractions. The power of language to dissect, to order,
to classify, and to abstract. was just what Rilke fought against.
Nor should we Jook for hidden meanings. "1 believe," he once
wrote, "that no poem in the Sonnets to Orpheus has a meaning
which is not fully stated in it.... Any kind of 'allusion'-would
contradict, according to my conviction, the indescribable existence [Da-sein] of the poem." "Tell bim the things:' "Dance the
orange." Rilke means what he says: create an object by saying it;
create an orange by dancing it. To belsure, the orange which you
dance is no longer the orange which you eat, just as the object
which you say has ceased to be an object of ordinary experience.
One has been transformed into the pure motion of the dance, the
odler into the pure act of saying, and dirough this transfQrmation
they have been incorporated into the timeless and nameless, invisible and eternal realm of the angel. "There rose a tree. 0 pure
transcendency! 0 Orpheus sings! 0 tall tree in dIe ear!" begins
the First Sonnet. Orpheus does not sing about a tree somewhere
out in nature; rather dlis tree, which transcends the natural tree
by being its transformation, exists only in the sounds of the song
which have created it. In the sounds of the song and in the ears of
those who hear it: "0 tall tree in the earl"
As stated earlier, objects which change remain themselves. The
concept of change would indeed be meaningless~ unless it were
dIe change of something that remains itself while it cbanges; and
"something that remains itself wbile it manges" is an object. The
ultimate issue of ordinary change, however, is not the preservation of an qbject's identity, but the annihilation of the object. Up
to a certairJ point, the object will retain its identity, but beyond
dmt point lie decay and destruction, dIe loss of its existence. And
in this sense, all change is a change towards death. "Blilhn und
verdorrn ist uns %ugleich bewusst/' we are aware of flowering and
fading simultaneously. But if the existence of the object were one
with its appearance. the concept of cbange would take on a very
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different meaning. If such an obj~ct changed its appearance. it
would also have to change its being~ But how can an object whose
being IS contained in its appearance, an object, that is, which in
order to exist at all must exist precisely as it does, change either
its appearance or its being? Every change of its appearance would
be eitber its destruction or (in the manner of those forms of art
which are based on motion) would be a coming into existence
and a staying in existence of "something" that does not exist except in the motion which creates "it," of something, in other
words, tbat has ceased to be a thing. For where being is contained
in appearance and where, accordingly, change is a change of being, there no longer is an "it," an object, but only the phenomenon of creative or pure change. Change, which a moment ago
seemed to spell destruction, appears now to conquer transcience
and to be productive of existence. "Tiinzerin: 0 du Verlegung /
alles ~ergehens in Gang. . :' uDancer: 0 translation / of all going-away [going out of existence] into going....,. Such existencecreating motion. be it the pure motion of the dance, or music. or
the pure act of saying, Rilke calls JVirklic1l1~eit, reality, or preferably Dasein, being or existence.:.! "Gesang ist Dasein," uS ong is
existence." It is not quite easy to talk about Rilke's concept of
Dasein; because. as pure existence. it is not the existence of somethil1g. Where objects exist, in Rilke's sense, there are no longer
objects: and where there still are objects, in the ordinary sense.
there is as yet no pure existence. It is for this reason that RiIke,
who in his middle period was enamoured with the visible surfaces
of things, came in the last years of his life to equate existence with
Unsichtbarlleit, invisibility.
Earth. isn't this what you want: an invisible
re-arising in us? Is it not your dream
to be one day invisible? Earthl invisiblel s
B It should, bowever, be noted tbat Rilke uses tbe same words with quite a different
meaning when be talks about the limitations and imperleetiom of human exist·
coce. It is this aspect of hig thought and poctry which has made it possible for the
Exi!Jtentdista to claim bim as one of their own.
• Translated by J. D. Lei!lhman and Stephen Spender in Duino Elegies, Rainer
Maria Rilke, (W. W. Norton: New York. 1939). p. 77
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Erik, ist es nicht dies, was du willst: unsicb.tbar
in uns'erstehn'l-[st es dein Traum nicht,
einmal unsichtbaf' zu sein7-ETde! unsiclltbar!

In the dance, actor and action are one. If you read the best of
Rilke's sonnets,-you will feel that here, too, there is a union of
actor and action, namely of subject and verb. The verb does not
contain a statement about the subject" rather the subject comes
into existence in the verb as the dancer does in the dance. And as
the dancer is contained in his motion and has no existence outside of it, these subjects, Rilke's Dingc, are contained in the words
of the poem and nowhere else. Objects and names, names and
objects: the antagonists are reconciled at last. And witli this, all
other distinctions fall away, too: the distinctions among individual objects, between suffering and joy, life and death, here and
hereafter. Thus the gedeutete Welt, the interpreted world, the
world which bears the imprint of language, which is divided up
into an infinity of individual objects and compartmentaliied according to linguistic categories is transformed into what Rilke
calls the "whole and sound world," the "great oneness," the
"open," or the "invisible:' The Elegies, which are mare philosophic in nature, talk, among other things, about transformation
and unfold a vision of this realm of onen~s. The Sonnets, which
come much closer to what is commonly meant by lyric poetry, try
to do what the Elegies talk about. I am using the word "try" ad·
visedly, for we are standing here at the ultimate limit of what can
still be done and said. Another step and we have passed through
"die letzte Ortsclzaft der Warte," through "the last village of
words" into unbroken silence.
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